Testimony of Katherine Van Wezel Stone Before the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations by Stone, Katherine Van Wezel
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 
April 1994 
Testimony of Katherine Van Wezel Stone Before the Commission 
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone 
Cornell University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Testimony is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal Publications by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Testimony of Katherine Van Wezel Stone Before the Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Stone, K. V. W. (1994). Testimony of Katherine Van Wezel Stone before the Commission on the Future of 
Worker-Management Relations. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Industrial and 
Labor Relations site: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/381/ 
This testimony is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/381 
MART1N P. CATHERWOOD UBW*" ,
 f . ^j ^ f 
NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL r*Tw*- w * v s ^ 
INDUSTRIAL AMD LABOR REUTIOHS 
Cornell Urtt^ sfty
 Testimony delivered to the 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Washington, D.C. 
Delivered by 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone 
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School and 
Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
April 6, 1994 
To The Honorable Mister Secretary, Chairman Dunlop, Members of the 
Commission, Fellow Panelists, Members of the Public: 
I am a Professor of Law at Cornell Law School and Cornell 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, where I teach courses in 
labpr law, employment law, and labor policy. In addition, I teach 
contracts, and a course about the law of alternative dispute 
resolution as it applies in fields other than labor, including 
securities law disputes, antitrust, matrimonial matters, and 
commercial contract disputes. Over the past fifteen years, I have 
written numerous law review articles about the use of arbitration 
in our existing system of collective bargaining. 
• 
I am honored to have this opportunity to address you today on 
the subject of the role of alternative dispute resolution in labor 
and employment disputes. The question for today's hearing"is found 
in the Mission Statement for the Commission. It is: 
What (if anything) should be done to increase the extent to 
which workplace problems are directly resolved by the parties 
themselves, rather than through recourse to litigation and 
regulatory bodies? 
The position I will take today is that we have already gone very 
far in the direction of private resolution of employment disputes 
by means of extreme judicial support for and deference to private 
arbitration. I will argue that we have gone too far, and that the 
role of arbitration in labor and employment relations should be 
curtailed. 
Recently the use of arbitration has in labor relations has 
m 
expanded into a new area — the area of worker statutory rights. 
This has occurred in two respects. First, by means of expansive 
interpretations of Section 3 01 preemption, courts have increasingly 
reguired unionized workers to arbitrate state law statutory rights. 
Second, under the recent Supreme Court ruling in Gilmer v. 
Johnson/Interstate Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), nonunion workers 
are reguired to arbitrate rights that arise under federal and state 
employment laws when they have expressly or impliedly agreed to 
arbitrate employment disputes. It is my position that we should 
not permit workers to waive their rights under state or federal 
employment statutes — we should not force parties to arbitrate 
statutory claims, we should not presume that promises to arbitrate 
include promises to arbitrate statutory claims, and we should not 
give arbitral rulings on statutory issues preclusive effect. To do 
otherwise potentially nullifies any efforts we might make to 
legislate on behalf of workers. 
In the next few minutes I will describe these new 
developments, explain my position and propose some legislative 
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solutions to what I see as the excessive reliance on arbitration in 
the labor and employment area. 
As you all know, private arbitration is a central feature of 
our collective bargaining system. Beginning in the late 1950's, in 
a series of pivotal cases, the Supreme Court and the National Labor 
Relations Board developed a series of legal doctrines which have 
given arbitration an elevated status in our collective bargaining 
system. These cases made agreements to arbitrate not only 
judicially enforceable but enforceable on the basis of a 
presumption of arbitrability. In addition, they approved the use 
of labor injunctions in support of labor arbitration and against 
strikes over issues that are subject to arbitration agreements. 
Further, they provided that arbitral awards are enforceable with a 
minimum amount of judicial review. And where there are disputes 
that implicate rights arising under the National Labor Relations 
Act as well as rights arising from a collective bargaining 
agreement, the courts and the Labor Board give broad deference to, 
and preference for, arbitration over judicial or administration 
mechanisms for resolving them. 
The cases which first proclaimed these labor law rules are 
well known fixtures of our collective bargaining laws. Indeed, the 
prominent role of arbitration is often said to be the central and 
defining feature of our system of collective bargaining. 
• . * 
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Arbitration has not always been featured so prominently in our 
collective bargaining system. In the 1920's and 1930's, courts 
enforced collective bargaining agreements as ordinary contracts, 
and very few agreements contained provisions for arbitration. 
Where there were arbitration promises, parties could avoid them 
easily given the historical disinclination of common law courts to 
enforce executory agreements to arbitrate. However, under the 
World War II War Labor Board, arbitration became a preferred method 
of resolving workplace disputes, often regarded as a substitute for 
industrial warfare and thus an essential aspect of the wartime no-
strike pledges. The War Labor Board encouraged parties to 
collective bargaining to include arbitration clauses in their 
contracts, and they accorded arbitration promises substantial 
deference. 
After the War, Congress enacted Section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, which on its face appeared to give 
federal courts jurisdiction to hear and decide labor disputes. In 
the next ten years, numerous scholars and practitioners in the 
labor field urged the courts to interpret Section 301 in a manner 
that respected the special role of arbitration. Justice Douglas 
adopted this position in 1957, in the case of Textile Workers v. 
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) where he called upon federal 
courts to develop a "federal common law of collective bargaining," 
the centerpiece of which was to be support for and deference to 
private arbitration. 
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For over decade, I have written numerous articles critical of 
the expansive scope of arbitration in the enforcement of collective 
bargaining agreements. My criticism grows out of my belief that 
collective bargaining agreements are contracts, and as such are 
entitled to judicial enforcement. We should not deprive workers of 
the due process protections that are available in a judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceeding for the protection of their contractual 
rights. Arbitration, with its informal processes and its limited 
remedies is simply not an adequate tribunal for many issues of 
interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreements. 
Even less so is it adequate for enforcement of statutory rights. 
My argument has several prongs. 
First I argue that arbitration is often an inadequate means of 
enforcing rights because it does not provide the due process 
protections available in a public tribunal, be it a court or an 
administrative agency. Arbitration does not provide the usual 
rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, 
compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath. 
In addition, in arbitration, there is no effective right of appeal. 
In short, arbitration provides workers with second-class justice. 
Second, remedies in arbitration are not as effective or as 
generous as remedies in a judicial forum. For example, most 
arbitrators believe that they do not have the power to award 
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damages for intangible harms, or to award punitive or consequential 
damages. In addition, arbitrators almost never grant interest on 
back pay awards, even when it is issued months or years after an 
unjust dismissal. It is common practice for an arbitrator to award 
reinstatement but no back pay at all to a worker fired without just 
cause. In contrast, prevailing parties in unjust dismissal 
litigation receive jury awards in the mid to high six figures. 
Furthermore, most arbitrators believe that they do not have the 
power to order provisional relief. Thus many contract violations, 
such as improper job assignments or safety matters, can neither be 
prevented nor remedied after the fact. 
Finally, arbitral decisions are invisible documents — they do 
not receive media attention or public scrutiny — tliey engender no 
public debate. Arbitrators are not public officials. They are not 
accountable to a larger public. And there is no legislative arena 
in which unpopular decisional trends can be challenged. 
Arbitration is a privatized forum, designed by the parties, and out 
of the public eye. 
On many occasions the Supreme Court has recognized the 
procedural short-comings of arbitration and has warned that such 
second-class procedures will affect the outcomes of disputes. For 
example, the Court stated in 1956, that: 
The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an 
important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of 
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action. The change from a court of law to an arbitration 
panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result. 
Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury...Arbitrators do 
not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they 
need not give their reasons for their results; the record of 
their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court 
trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than 
judicial review of a trial. Berhnardt v.Polygraph Co. of 
America. 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956). 
These words were written Justice Douglas, who spearheaded the 
adoption of broad support for arbitration in labor cases. He wrote 
these words in Bernhardt v. Polygraph Co. of America, a nonlabor 
case arising under the Federal Arbitration Act, in 1956, one year 
before he wrote the controversial and path-breaking opinion in 
Lincoln Mills. Justice Douglas repeated these sentiments in 1974, 
in another nonlabor case, where he criticized judicial deference to 
arbitration of statutory claims. He said: 
An arbitral award can be made without explication of reasons 
and without development of a record, so that the arbitrator's 
conception of our statutory requirement may be absolutely 
incorrect yet functionally unreviewable...The loss of the 
proper judicial forum carries with it the loss of substantial 
rights. 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (Douglas 
dissenting) (1974). 
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Similar arguments about the lack of due process in arbitration 
and the consequences for the outcomes of disputes have been raised 
by many Supreme Court Justices over the past four decades, 
including Justice Black in his dissent in Maddox v. Republic Steel, 
379 U.S. 650, 669 (1965); by Justice Brennan in his majority 
opinion in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1803 
(1984); by Justice Blackmum, in his dissent in Shearson/American 
m 
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987); by Justice Reed 
in his majority opinion in Wilko v. Svan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); 
by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3365 (1985); and by Justice Harlan 
in his concurrance in U.S. Bulk Carriers Inc. v. Arquelles, 400 
U.S. 351, 365 (1971). Clearly then, many on the Court have 
recognized the procedural short-comings of arbitration and have 
questioned the wisdom and justice of permitting private arbitration 
to substitute for judicial or administrative tribunals for 
resolving disputes. 
Because so many Justices have questioned the adequacy of 
arbitration over the past four decades, why has the Supreme Court 
repeatedly expanded the scope of arbitration in the labor context? 
In part the reason is the belief that labor arbitration is faster, 
cheaper, more flexible, and more supportive of on-going relations 
than is judicial resolution of disputes. However, empirical 
evidence of these claims is suprising sparse. 
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The other reason that Justice Douglas and others have 
enthusiastically supported the use of arbitration in the labor 
context while rejecting it in other contexts is that they believe 
arbitration plays a crucial role in the self-regulatory aspects of 
collective bargaining. That is, they describe collective 
bargaining as an exercise in workplace self-government and the 
unionized workplace as an autonomous microsmic democracy. In the 
autonomous, self-governing system, there is private rule-making in 
the form of collective bargaining and private rule-enforcing in the 
form of private arbitration. The latitude and deference accorded 
to the private workplace judiciary is thus justified as part of a 
larger strategy of promoting this conception of workplace self-
government . 
The promotion of a workplace that is an autonomous self-
regulating democratic institution is a laudable goal. Indeed, the 
aspiration of workplace democracy is one which I embrace 
wholeheartedly and hope that this Commission will find means to 
further. However, we must not fall into the trap of believing that 
by describing the workplace as democratic, we have made it so. The 
description of the workplace as a self-regulating democracy which 
underlies judicial support for labor arbitration has had a 
paradoxical and counter-productive effect on workers' rights, as 
will become evident when we turn to the recent trends in the law of 
labor and employment arbitration. 
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In two different but parallel developments, labor and 
employment law has expanded the use of labor arbitration into the 
area of arbitration of workers' statutory rights. Both 
developments are matters for concern, for they threaten to nullify 
present and future legislative efforts to protect workers. 
First, in the past ten years, there has been an increase in 
the preemptive scope of Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act. Section 301 preemption has become so extensive 
that, today, most efforts by unionized workers to enforce 
employment law rights that they have, or think they have, under 
state law are automatically dismissed. This development, referred 
to by Judge Alex Kosinski in his dissent in the Livadas case as the 
dubious doctrine of quasi-preemption, has the effect of depriving 
unionized workers of the benefits of state law employment rights 
and placing them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis nonunion workers, who 
enjoy extensive employment law rights under state law. 
Section 301 pre-emption is the doctrine that says when a 
unionized worker attempts to exercise a state-created employment 
right, she cannot do so if the underlying basis of her action is 
enforcement of her collective bargaining agreement. Rather, any 
suit involving enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement is 
a Section 301 claim, and under established 301 doctrine, must be 
resolved in private arbitration. 
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Section 301 preemption has become a central feature of 
employment litigation in the past decade. Beginning in the mid-
1970' s, state courts and legislatures began to create extensive 
rights for individual employees. This explosion in employment 
rights included rights not to be fired abusively, rights not to be 
subjected to drug or lie detector tests, rights to have one's 
privacy protected, rights not to be defamed in job references, 
rights for whistle-blowers to speak out publically about employer 
wrong-doing, rights to notification for plant closings, rights to 
be free of sexual harassment, and improved rights to be free of 
racial and sexual discrimination. Indeed, the 1980's was an 
unprecedented period in American history for the creation of 
individual employment rights. These rights were usually at the 
v. 
state level. 
Given the existence of these new employment rights, the 
important question for a unionized worker is, what happens when she 
tries to take advantage of them? For example, what is the fate of 
a union member who sues on a state law statute barring employer 
drug testing or unjust dismissal? The^lse. answer is that in the 
great majority of cases and with very few exceptions, this union 
member is not permitted to sue because the suit is preempted by 
Section 301. 
In the past ten years, courts have applied Section 301 
preemption with extraordinary reach, finding all kinds of lawsuits 
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to be de facto efforts to enforce collective bargaining agreements, 
even when the worker-plaintiff made no effort at all to invoke her 
collective agreement. 
When a suit is preempted under Section 301, there are two 
practical conseguences. First, all claims for breach of a 
collective bargaining agreement must be decided in private 
arbitration rather than by a court, with effectively no right of 
judicial review. Thus once a claim is preempted under Section 301, 
the worker's only and final recourse is to private arbitration. As 
a result, unionized workers find that by virtue of the Section 301 
preemption rules, they do not have access to any court to assert 
their state law claims. 
Second and perhaps more significantly, when a claim is 
preempted under Section 3 01, the worker's state law rights are 
extinguished. In arbitration, the arbitrator applies the law of 
the collective bargaining agreement, not the external state law 
which the worker sought to invoke. Thus the unionized worker whose 
state law claim is preempted receives neither the benefit of a 
judicial forum nor the benefit of the substantive provisions of the 
state law. 
In a survey of hundreds of Section 301 preemption cases 
decided over the past decade, I found an astonishingly simple 
pattern. When unionized workers attempted to exercise state 
employment rights, they were not able to do so. Rather, by virtue 
of the pre-emption rules, the courthouse door was closed. 
Let me summarize my findings. First, a great many of the 
developments in state employment law have been in the area of 
wrongful discharge. Unionized workers have been particularily 
disadvantaged in this area by the preemption rules. Claims by 
unionized workers that they have been unjustly dismissed are almost 
always preempted. In addition, most suits brought by unionized 
workers on the basis of other new state law rights are also 
preempted. Courts routinely preempt claims of unlawful drug 
testing, claims of defamation by an employer's derogatory remarks, 
claims that an employer conducted an unlawful search of a person or 
automobile, claims concerning the mishandling of health insurance, 
medical leave, or other medical obligations, and claims that an 
employer breached a promise to an employee who is in a bargaining 
unit. Indeed, very few cases brought by unionized workers survive 
dismissal for preemption, and those that do fall into a small 
number of narrowly-honed exceptions. 
Overall, American courts in the 1980's formulated a very broad 
pre-emption rule for Section 301, much broader than they apply in 
other ares of law. In fact, the courts developed a de facto 
. These results, with supporting authority, are discussed 
more fully in Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial 
Pluralism; The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the 
New Deal Collective Bargaining System. 59 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 
575, 605-620 (1992). 
13 
presumption to pre-empt all cases in which a unionized worker 
asserts a state employment right. Furthermore, in a 1991 decision, 
the Ninth Circuit proposed a principle of preemption that would 
extend it beyond what any court has yet done. In a case called 
Schlacter-Jones v. General Telephone of California, 936 F.2d 435, 
441 (9th Cir. 1991), the court stated that, in a unionized 
workplace, claims about any working conditions that were within the 
scope of collective bargaining would be preempted. This 
suggestion, if adopted by other Circuits, would effectively seal 
off all unionized workplaces from state employment regulation. As 
a result, the pre-emption doctrine has so structured the legal 
landscape that unorganized workers now have, in some respects, more 
employment rights than their unionized counterparts. 
Now, one might ask, what's wrong with a broad Section 301 
preemption doctrine that leaves unionized workers with their right 
to private arbitration? The answer is that, first, when a case is 
preempted under Section 3 01, the law converts the unionized 
worker's statutory claim into a claim arising under her collective 
bargaining agreement. The arbitrator's task is to apply the 
collective agreement, not the relevant statute. Thus in Section 
301 arbitration, unionized workers' statutory rights are 
extinguished and replaced by contractual rights. This would not be 
a problem if unions were able to secure strong contractual 
protections for their members. However, after years of concession 
bargaining, judicial restrictions on the scope of mandatory 
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bargaining, and employer use of striker replacements, unions have 
seen their bargaining strength erode. As a result, their 
collective bargaining agreements have become weaker and weaker. In 
fact, it is precisely because employment law statutes seem to 
provide workers with stronger protections and better remedies than 
those contained in their collective bargaining agreements that 
unionized workers frequently bring legal actions on the basis of 
their statutory rights rather than rely on grievances to assert 
their contractual rights. Yet the law of Section 3 01 preemption 
says that in such cases, the unionized worker is out of luck. Thus 
judicial interpretation of Section 301 has so structured the legal 
landscape that unorganized workers now have, in some respects, more 
employment rights than their unionized counterparts. Indeed, one 
might hypothesize that the expansion in Section 301 preemption and 
the consequent application of labor arbitration to unionized 
workers' statutory claims has contributed to union decline. 
The second legal development which has expanded arbitration 
into the realm of statutory employment rights concerns the use of 
arbitration by employers of nonunion workers. In 1991, the Supreme 
Court decided the case of Gilmer v. Johnson/Interstate Lane Corp. , 
500 U.S. 20 (1991), holding that an employee of a stock brokerage, 
who alleged he was fired in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, had to arbitrate his claim pursuant to an 
arbitration clause in a standard stock exchange registration form 
which he was required to file when he began work. The Gilmer 
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Court held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, an Act which makes makes arbitration 
promises in contracts involving commerce "valid, irrevocable, and 
enforeable." 9 U.S.C. §2. 
The Gilmer Court's reasoning was based on a series of recent 
cases in which it had applied many of the precedents about labor 
arbitration under Section 301 to commercial arbitration under the 
FAA. For example, it quoted its decision in Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983), where it said that the FAA evidences a "'liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration.'" Quoted in Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 
1651. In addition, the Gilmer court referred to its holdings in 
Mitsubishi and McMahon that "statutory claims may be the subject of 
an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA." Id. at 
1652. It rejected plaintiff's arguments that mandated arbitration 
of Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims was inconsistent 
with the statutory framework. In response to the plaintiff's 
argument that the ADEA embodies important social policies which 
should not be determined in private tribunals, the Court noted that 
in recent years it had found that antitrust act claims, securities 
act claims, and RICO claims to be amenable to arbitration under the 
FAA. It quoted Mitsubishi to the effect that: 
"So long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate 
[his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, 
the statute wall continue to serve both its remedial and 
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deterrent function." 
Id at 1653, quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637. The Gilmer Court 
also rejected, without much dicussion, the plaintiff's arguments 
that arbitration procedures were inherently inadequate to protect 
statutory rights. 
Justice Stevens, in dissent, raised what is perhaps the most 
troubles ome aspect of the Gilmer opinion; the fact that Section 1 
of the FAA has an exclusion for contracts of employment. The 
majority gave short shrift to that problem, stating that because 
the arbitration clause originated in a contract between the 
plaintiff and the stock exchange, not in a contract between an 
employee and his immediate employer, it was not an employment 
contract for purposes of the FAA exclusion. In addition, the Court 
noted that the issue of the Section 1 exclusion had not been raised 
by the litigants or developed in the record. Thus, the Court said 
it was not obliged to address it in detail, and that it was leaving 
that issue "for another day." Id. at 1651-52 & n. 2. 
The Gilmer dissent argued that the majority's treatment of the 
scope of the FAA exclusion for employment contracts was exceedingly 
narrow and technical. It said that Congress had excluded 
employment contracts from the FAA out of its concern that 
arbitration promises contained in employment contracts were not 
"truly voluntary," but might arise out of excessive inequality of 
bargaining power. These concerns, the dissent argued, should be 
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implemented by giving an expansive interpretation to the employment 
exclusion, and by refusing to apply the FAA to arbitration of ADEA 
or other employment-related statutory claims. Id. at 1659-61. 
The majority in Gilmer also considered and rejected the 
argument that Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), 
precluded arbitration of employment discrimination claims. In the 
Gardner-Denver case, the Supreme Court held that an arbitration 
proceeding does not preclude judicial determination of an 
employee's Title VII claim. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, 
said: 
[W]e have long recognized that 'the choice of forums 
inevitably affects the scope of the substantive right to be 
vindicated.'... Respondent's deferral rule is necessarily 
premised on the assumption that arbitral processes are 
commensurate with judicial processes and that Congress 
impliedly intended federal courts to defer to arbitral 
decisions on Title VII issues. We deem this supposition 
unlikely." 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56. 
The Gilmer majority distinguished Gardner-Denver on the ground 
that that case involved a unionized workers' claim and an 
arbitration promise contained in a collective bargaining agreement, 
thus posing difficult issues of relationship between a collective 
representative and an individual right, issues which were not 
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present in Gilmer. 
Since 1991, many lower federal courts have interpreted Gilmer 
expansively. Several courts have applied Gilmer and found 
discrimination claims arbitrable in cases in which an arbitration 
promise arose directly from an employment contract between an 
employer and an employee, rather than the third-party arbitration 
promise involved in Gilmer. These cases practically read the 
employment exclusion in Section 1 of the FAA out of existence. 
They resurrect an old, and formerly rejected, interpretation of 
that exclusion that limited its application to contracts of 
employment in the transportation sector. In addition, some lower 
courts are applying the FAA to claims involving other employment-
related statues, including claims based on laws prohibiting race, 
sex, religion, and handicapped discrimination, and claims based on 
ERISA. 
In addition, some lower courts have questioned the continued 
viability of Gardner-Denver in light of Gilmer. They suggest that 
the Supreme Court might soon hold that unionized workers will be 
required to arbitrate not only their state law employment rights, 
as they are presently under Section 301 preemption, but also their 
federal employment rights. 
To the extent that the courts interpret Gilmer to require 
unorganized workers to arbitrate all employment-related statutory 
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claims, and to the extent that they extend Gilmer to unionized 
workers, they are taking the Supreme Court's commitment to labor 
arbitration far beyond its initial rationale. They are abandoning 
the justification for judicial deference to arbitration in the 
Steelworkers' Trilogy, that labor arbitrators have a special 
expertise in the law of the shop which they can bring to bear in 
the resolution of disputes. In 1980, Justice Brennan warned that 
arbitration may not adequately protect workers' statutory rights. 
As he said, 
"because the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains 
primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land,... 
many arbitrators may not be conversant with the public law 
considerations underlying [statutory claims]." 
Barrentine v. Arklansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 743 
(1981). In addition, if these trends continue, courts are taking 
employment concerns out of the public arena, and beyond public 
scrutiny and political accountability. 
From a practical perspective, the increased reliance on 
arbitration to resolve the statutory claims of nonunion workers and 
to preclude the statutory claims of unionized workers, makes it 
exceedingly difficult for legislatures to enact meaningful statutes 
that give employees protection. For example, while Congress 
intended to legislate protections for workers' health in the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, if provisions of the 
OSHA statute are found to be arbitrable under the FAA, and if 
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Gardner-Denver is overturned and the reasoning of Gilmer is applied 
to unionized workers' federal rights, then OSHA's health 
protections for unionized and nonunion workers will be subjected to 
the variable, unpredictable, and invisible outcomes of private 
arbitration. It will be difficult for Congress to monitor the 
effectiveness of its legislative efforts, or revise the legislation 
to treat pressing social problems. 
Last month the New York Times reported that more and more 
employers are requiring their nonunion employees to agree to 
boilerplate arbitration agreements at the time of hire. Employees, 
who at the moment of hire, lack bargaining power and are needful of 
employment, frequently agree to such terms without giving them much 
though. However, these employees may soon learn that they have 
unwittingly waived all of their statutory protections under both 
federal and state law. 
For these reasons, I urge this Commission to consider 
legislative proposals that would reverse these trends and restrict 
the excessive use of labor arbitration to resolve disputes over 
workers' statutory rights. My specific proposals to address these 
problems are that Congress to enact legislation that would 
(1) state that Section 301 is not intended to preempt state 
or federal employment law statutes; and 
(2) reaffirming a broad interpretation of the FAA's 
employment exclusion and expressly repudiating the result of Gilmer 
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v. Johnson/Interstate Lane. 
Let me conclude by saying that while it might £>e too late in 
the day to advocate that we eliminate the use of arbitration to 
resolve disputes concerning collective bargaining ag r e e m e nts it is 
possible to restrict its scope and reverse the new directions in 
the law arbitration. These new directions, I hop^ j have shown, 
will in the long run prove very costly to the welf^re 0f American 
workers. 
• 
Thank you. 
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